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On June 6, 1822, a man named alexis st. martin suf-fered a close-range shotgun blast while working as a voyageur for the american fur comPany on mackinac 
island, michigan. He had the good fortune to be attended by 
William Beaumont (1785–1853), a surgeon in the United States 
Army (for whom an Army hospital in El Paso, Texas, is named 
to this day). Mr. St. Martin’s fist-sized wound was grievous and 
did not heal promptly. Instead, it remained open – this is known 
as a permanent gastric fistula – and permitted, apparently for the 
first time, a sustained direct view of the digestive process. Dr. 
Beaumont conducted important experiments that significantly 
increased scientific knowledge.1 For his part, Mr. St. Martin 
lived to the ripe old age of 86, dying in Canada in 1880.
Now why in the world, you are wondering, am I going into 
this tale? The answer is simple: the events of the last few years 
have given us a comparable opportunity to see and perhaps bet-
ter understand interrogation than most of us who are not in law 
enforcement have had in earlier times.
* * *
The news media have paid close attention to interrogation 
techniques, and even casual readers of the newspapers who 
never served a day in either law enforcement, the military, or 
the intelligence agencies, at least recognize the term “Field 
Manual” as if it was a “Betty Crocker” cookbook or Boy Scouts 
publication.
We know from the “torture papers” that the Office of Legal 
Counsel in the last administration – or at least some of its high 
officials – joining forces with Vice President Dick Cheney’s 
staff and other allies, secretly sought to authorize, or at least 
immunize from prosecution, various forms of torture and 
other ill-treatment of detainees by erecting permissive defini-
tions. Congress was complicit, even if it was not privy to the 
 Yoo-Bybee memoranda of 2002–03, by including within the 
Military Commissions Act a provision that effectively immu-
nized certain conduct by interrogators undertaken prior to the 
effective date of the MCA.
On the other hand, Congress and President Obama have both 
sought to freeze permissible interrogation techniques by enact-
ing into law a mere Army “Field Manual,”2 seeking to impose a 
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set of outer limits for interrogations – surely a first in our coun-
try – beyond the bare bones (so to speak) of the Torture Act of 
2000.3 As Professor David Cole of Georgetown has reminded 
us, President George W. Bush vetoed a bill requiring the CIA to 
hew to the interrogation techniques approved by that manual.4 
Less promisingly, Congress also conferred on President Bush 
the power to define what conduct represents cruel, inhuman, 
and degrading treatment for purposes of Common Article 3 of 
the Geneva Conventions5 – a power he promptly used to blow 
an Alexis-St. Martin-size hole in the Conventions.6
There is no doubt that this is unfamiliar territory for us 
and our political and legal institutions. Who would ever have 
thought that an on-leave law professor working in the Office of 
Legal Counsel would be called upon – and would accept the task 
– of defining torture by reference to antiseptic-sounding clinical 
concepts such as “organ failure.”7 Or that we would be faced 
with a bizarre arrangement under which detailed rules might be 
spelled out for military personnel while CIA operatives were left 
to their own devices?
What we have, thanks in large measure to the Freedom of 
Information Act8 and litigants willing to invoke it (and govern-
ment employees willing to “leak”), is a measure of transparency 
far beyond what is customary in such sensitive matters. Are 
we learning more than we need to know? Is that even pos-
sible, given the disastrous course of the last several years under 
President Bush?
Personally, although I believe there are aspects to govern-
mental activity that can and should be kept out of the public 
eye, my view is that the St. Martin experience we have endured 
on the subject of interrogation is a salutary one. We’ve seen up-
close-and-personal the nasty side of interrogations. The question 
is what we are going to do about it.
Whether there will be a formal reckoning (in the sense of 
criminal prosecution) with respect to interrogation abuses, as 
has increasingly been suggested,9 remains to be seen, but even 
if no one is punished through the criminal process as opposed to 
the judgment of history, there are lessons to be learned. Congress 
has to be more aggressive about its oversight responsibilities. A 
harbinger of things to come in this regard is the report issued 
in late 2008 by the Senate Armed Services Committee on the 
treatment of detainees in United States custody. Unfortunately, 
much of that report remains classified, but it is to the credit of 
Senator Carl Levin and his colleagues that the summary10 was 
made public.
Impeachment is another legislative function. There was 
never any meaningful support for impeaching President Bush11 
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“Because abusive interrogation practices can have such 
disastrous effects – not only on the affected individuals, 
but for our country as a whole – we should resist the 
temptation to put this unpleasant episode behind us and  
to take no further, continuing interest in the subject.  
To do so is to invite trouble.”
because of the unsettling effect of such action on the country as 
a whole. This was especially so as the end of his second term 
loomed. But what of subordinate civilian officials? Would no 
purpose have been served by considering the impeachment of 
some of them, to impose a moral stigma, for example, and bar 
them from holding federal office in the future?12
Call me naïve, but it is my conviction that despite the failing 
marks a number of important institutions in American govern-
ment and society have earned in the past several years, “sun-
light,” which Justice Brandeis aptly described as the “best of 
disinfectants,”13 has played a potent and positive role. Because 
abusive interrogation practices can have such disastrous effects 
– not only on the affected individuals, but for our country as a 
whole – we should resist the temptation to put this unpleasant 
episode behind us and to take no further, continuing interest in 
the subject. To do so is to invite trouble.
* * *
Congress is aware that it has to act. Last year, Representative 
David Price (D-N.C.) introduced the Interrogation and Detention 
Reform Act of 200814 that would make important improve-
ments. Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.) introduced inter-
rogation reform legislation when the 111th Congress convened 
last month.15 Rather than go through all of the specifics of 
these proposals, let me catalog some of the things we should be 
looking for.
First, there must be a single, known, official standard.16 
We cannot have one rule for CIA interrogations and another 
for Defense Department interrogations. To permit competing 
rulebooks is to invite both chaos and evasion. To his credit, 
President Obama’s January 22, 2009 Executive Order on 
“Ensuring Lawful Interrogations”17 applies across the board, so 
that other agencies must use “processes that are substantially 
equivalent to the processes the [Army Field] Manual prescribes 
for the Department of Defense.” Wisely, that Executive Order 
also forbids any federal official who interrogates individuals in 
United States custody in armed conflicts to rely on any inter-
pretation issued by the Justice Department between September 
11, 2001 and January 20, 2009 with respect to federal criminal 
laws, the Convention against Torture, Common Article 3 of the 
Geneva Conventions, or the Field Manuals. Executive Order 
13491 bespeaks a measure of publicly-acknowledged personal 
involvement on the part of the Chief Executive that is not only 
a sharp break from the immediate past but also important for 
the signal it sends throughout the government and to interested 
foreign observers.
Second, we should never lose sight of the golden rule. Our 
concern at all times must be to maintain the high ground not 
only because of our national moral compass, but also because 
the tables may well be turned if and when our personnel fall into 
enemy hands. This is an easy rule to remember and apply.
We must be prepared for detentions, rather than have to 
make up the rules, and search for legal authority, in real time.
We must insist on training. Interrogation may be a science; 
it is certainly an art.18 It makes no more sense to undertake an 
interrogation program without trained interrogators than it does 
to send into battle infantrymen who lack training in the use of 
their weapons.
We must recognize that interrogation of persons in American 
custody is an enormous responsibility – and an inherently gov-
ernmental function. This means it is a function that must only be 
performed by government personnel, not contractors.19 Only in 
this way can we hope to ensure the necessary accountability.
We must demand that judge advocates and civilian govern-
ment attorneys remain proactively mindful of their professional 
responsibilities to be a check-and-balance rather than simply 
members of a priesthood with power to pronounce a benediction 
over a course of action charted by others who may be more senior 
but less scrupulous. What broad “lessons learned” in the area of 
professional responsibility are being studied at the services’ law 
schools in Charlottesville, Newport, and Montgomery?
We must be willing to punish our own, wherever they may be 
in the official pecking order, or put on the public record cogent 
reasons – if such there be – for not doing so. To the extent that 
dereliction of duty may be at issue, or oppression of prisoners, 
President Obama should consider increasing the potential maxi-
mum punishments under military law, as he has the power to do 
under Article 56 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.20 This 
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will not have any impact on past conduct, of course,21 but it is a 
way of sending a message as to the seriousness with which we 
view these matters and thereby deterring future violations.
We must be alert to migration. On one level this means that 
activities undertaken in some other setting – Survival, Evasion, 
Resistance, and Escape (“SERE”) training, for example – are not 
necessarily a reliable indicator of permissible conduct in actual 
detention operations. On another level, before an interrogation 
regime is permitted to migrate (as in the ill-advised decision to 
send Maj. Gen. Geoffrey D. Miller to Iraq to “GITMO-ize” the 
detention facility at Abu Ghraib), it must be vetted carefully 
and at the highest levels to ensure that it comports with national 
policy.
Finally, perhaps the most potent check on torture and abusive 
interrogation is the power to resign. The grim history of the last 
administration demonstrates that internal “push back” can be 
effective. But at times more than that may be required. We do 
not have a robust tradition of resignation-on-principle in this 
country, but if we continue to find ourselves at or over the limits, 
then I hope we will have officials with the moral courage to “put 
their stars on the table” and resign – perhaps noisily, perhaps 
quietly.22 I hope that those who resisted the worst in the Bush 
Administration will serve as role models. HRB
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